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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WALKER BANK & TRUST COMP A NY, Executor of the Estate of
IUJRBERT E. SARGENT,
Deceased,
Plaintiff,
-vs.-

Case
No.10629

STATE TAX COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendant.

THE~

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
STATEMENTOFNATUREOFCASE
This matter comes before the court on appeal from
the decision of the State Tax Commission of Utah. The
question presented is whether or not stepchildren in loco
zian0;11tis to a decedent qualify as "children" of that
de('odent under the provisions of Section 59-12-2, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE
STATE TAX COMMISSION
After consideration of all pertinent facts and the
la\Y, the State Tax Commission on April 27, 1966, ren1

dered a decision disallowing 1he $40,000 cxrrnption lliii[
denying the refund sought by th(_• iictitio11cr Wnlliii
Bank and Trust Company, cxceutor of 1lie cRtatc of 1f 1.1_
bert E. Sargent, arnl plaintiff in thiR ad ion.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the decision of Ap 1 ;1
27, 1966, above referred to, and in particular a rPfonrl
of $1,200.00 paid to the State as inheritance taxPs at ilii
earlier point in this proceeding. (Rrcord 24-28)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties to this action have entered into D Stij111lation of Facts (R. 64-66). These are restated in c;llhstance in the Commission's formal decision (R. 61-6~1),
and set forth ·with substantial accuracy in the brief of
plaintiff, Walker Bank and Trnst Company.
One additional fact not fournl in any of these documents should be noted. The surviving stepchildren, Edward R., William Y., and Richard L. Bywater, had attained adulthood and left the home of Herbert E. Sarge11L
many years before his death.

ARGU.MENT
POINT I
rrHE TERM "CHILDREN" IN SECTION
50-12-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, rs
NOri.1 AMBIGUOUS AND MAY NOT PROPF~RLY BE CONsrrRUED TO EXTEND THE
$40,000 l'~XK\fprrION BENEFirr TO STEPCHILDREN OR OTHERS IN LOCO PARENTIS TO A Dl'~CEDENT.
SN·tio11 39-12-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, sets
fortli 111e rates of taxation arnl exemption of estates of
rnrious sizes, and providrs in part as fo11ows:
A tax equal to the sum of the following percentages of the market value of the net estate shall
lie' imposed upon the transfer of the net estate of
evcr.Y dcecdent, whether a resident or nonresident
of this state:
'l1luce per cent of the amount by which the net estate exceeds $10,000 nnd not to exceed $25,000, except ·where propert~- not exeeeding in value the
sum of $40,000 goes to the husband, ·wife and/or
children of the deceased or any or all of them by
descent, de,-ise, bequest or transfer directly or
th rough a trustee, then in such case the exemptions
shall be the amount so going not to exceed $40,000.
'flrns, an exemption is created in the amount of
$10,000 for any estate, but if property is left to the husband, wife and/or children of the deceased, the exemption ean he as great as $40,000.
Plaintiff asserts in Point I of his brief that there is
rlonht as to the legislative intent in the use of the term
3

"children" in this prov1s10n, and therefore, the tt>rrn
''children'' should be applied to include stepchildren iu
loco parentis as well as natural children. Without at.
tempting to pass on the soundness of this lO'gical garnhit,
we would suggest that the premise on which it is bal'ed,
that an ambiguity exists in the statute requiring extra.
legislative interpretive aid, is clearly erroneous.
Plaintiff cites some cases in support of this contention ( p. 5), none of which deal with construction of the
term "children," all rather supporting generally the
proposition that ambiguities in statutes imposing taxation should be construed in favor of those bearing the
burden of the tax (which proposition will be subsequently
examined).
The word "children" is a term of precision and has
a definite meaning in legal as well as general usage. Despite counsel's assertion that there are no decisions of
this honorable court interpreting this term in the context of Section 59-12-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, tl1e
case of In Re Walton's Estate, 115 Utah 160, 203 P. 2d 293
(1949), involved this precise problem. The court rather
summarily rejected the claim of the executrix of the Walton estate, Elizabeth M. Jerrell, that grandchildren arc
entitled to the larger exemption. Chief Justice Pratt,
writing for the majority of the court, spoke of the commonly accepted meaning of the term ''children'' as being
sons and daughters and said that if the term "children"
is to be used in any other sense, or extended in its meaning, such use must be as a result of specific legislative
directive. He examined the section above quoted am!
4

relai cJ provisions, and condrnled that the term is therein
Justice Wolfe, in a con11 srcl in its common meaning.
(•nrring opinion, agreed that the word should be given its
"plain and literal meaning."
1'he comments of these justices bring to mind the
"plain meaning" rule of statutory construction, which
is that when a statute is plain on its face and without amliiguiiv it meam, what it says, and ambiguities should not
hr created hy tortured and unnatural construction based
npon remote hypotheticals. Generally, words of the statute are to be construed in the ordinary sense and meaning given them and commonly attributable to them. In
Re Thompson's Estate, 72 Utah 17, 269 Pac. 103 (1927).

·we thus submit that the meaning of the word "chil-

tlren'' in this statute, and other statutes of this type, is
clear. In this type of legislation the term "children"
may include adopted as well as natural children, and illegitimate as well as legitimate children, depending upon
the particular jurisdiction, but does not extend beyond
these relationships. This can be emphasized by reference
to Appendix A of phintiff's brief. Where-ver state legislaturrs have determined that stepchildren should be inrl11rfrrl in the same classification as natural or adopted
cliildrrm, for inheritance ta«- p11rposes, they have specifically so prm,ided by inclusion in the statute describing
that rlassification, the word "stepchildren" or a;nother
word or phrase of similar import. Counsel has cited no
case in which a state not hal'ing such specific statutory
7no 1'ision has construed the term" children" in these ta<rstatutes to include stepchildren or others not children
5

ioho are in loco parcntis rclatio11sliips. 'l.'hc langnagr·
chosen in these statutes, and the net result of the application of such language, vary according to legislatire
intent.

Abundant case authority supports the propol:liti 011
above set forth. For example, in Houston v. Mc:Ki1111cy,
54 Fla. 600, 45 So. 480 (1907), the eourt sai(l in disrussin;;
a statute involving descent and distribution that "tl1P primary sense of children is offspring and that is tlw sen~1'
of relationship in whieh it is ordinarily used \Ylic11 tht)
question of relationship is i1ffolnd .... It cannot be properly held when found in a statute or contra.et to include
stepchildren.'' To the same effect are Snydor v. Palmer,
29 \,Vis. 226 (1871), Bla11kenbaker v. Suyder, 18 Ky. L:rn
Rep. 4:17, 36 S.\V. 1124 (1896), 'Pepper v. Supreme Co1111cil of Royal Arcanum, 59 N. ,J. Eq. 321, 45 Atl. 111 (18!J!l),
and In Re O'Co11~wrs 1Vill, 140 :Mise. 757, 251 N. Y. S.
686 (1931).
Plaintiff plaees great re lianee upon the assertion tliat
taxing statutes should he eonstrued i11 fa,·or d the taxpayer. The Tax Commission has no quanel with tli:·
the proposition that where a statute is ambig·uons as t 11
whether or not a particular tax should })e imposr:l, snd1
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the taxpa~-c·r:
however, one of the primary principles of revenue statute interpretation is that provisions sPtting forth exemption from taxes of general imposition must be construed
against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing po1cPr.
Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679, 24 L. Ed. 558, :rno
(1878), Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 48 Pae. 1097,
6

I IH~ll); Still'/11011 \'. Lyn<'h,

56 Utah 540, 192 Pac. 272;

12 1\. L. B. :'ifJ2, ( 1920).
As a general rule, grants of tax exemptions are
ginn a rigid interpretation against the assertions
of the taxpayer arnl in favor of the taxing power.
The basis for the rule here is the same as that
supporting a rule of strict construction of positin revenue laws - that the burden of taxation
should be distributed equally and fairly among the
members of society. Sutherland, Statutory Constrnction, 3cl ed., se<:>. 6702. See also Cooley, Taxation, 4th ed., sec. 672.

Tt is clenr tlrnt the problem of exemption and not the
prolllPm of imposition is here involved, since the question
lwfore the court is not whether or not the tax is appro1wiate, hut simply whether plai11tiff is entitled to a larger
or smnller exemption.
Ex(•mption, like taxation, is a matter of legislative
priYilege and grace, and "not properly to be claimed
beyond the extent to ·which the law-making body has seen
fit to allow it." 85 C.J.S. Taxation, sec. 1157. See also In
Rr Foss' Estatr, 114 Wash. 681, 196 Pac. 10 (1921); Peck
Y. State, 96 Cal. App. 2d 638, 216 Pac. 2d 132 (1950).
As stated in rorpus Juris SPcundum:
Generally, statutory exemptions from inheritance
or similar taxes should be strictly construed
against the claimant thereof, and held applicable
onl~T to subject matter or beneficiaries clearly
within their terms. 85 C.J.S. Taxation, sec. 1157.
A statutory exemption of a transfer to a person
or persons bearing a certain relationship to de7

cedent, such as that of \vife or hushalld, and a
statutory exemption of a transfer to a pcrso11 01 .
persons bearing a relationship to the decrdent
such as that of ch.ild ... ?'PP~ies when, and rml!J
uihcn, the person in question is of the designated
relationship . ... (Emphasis supplied.) 85 C..J.S.
Taxation, sec. 1163.
The thesis last set forth is applicable in this juri.~
diction, since our Supreme Court has held that the literal
terms of our inheritance tax statutes cannot be extended
by constru0tion. In Re Thompson's Estate, supra.
Thus, if the court should see ambiguities in Scrt1on
59-12-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, of significance in
the instant case, it is by no means clear that tlwse need
be resolved in the manner most favorable to plaintiff. We
\\'Ould strongly suggest, however, that such ambiguities
are not present, that the statute is clear and comprehensible, and that the court need not resort to any rules of
interpretation beyond the plain meaning rule to <leiermine the legislative intent behind Section 59-12-2.
"Where the language of the statute is clear, rule:,; of
construction applicable in case of doubt do not apply."
85 C.J.S. Taxation, sec. 1135. See also Tacenor "· J'aJ'
Commission of Iowa, 231 Iowa 362, 300 N.\V. 653 (1941).
POINT II
AS A RESULT OF THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF INHERITANCE AND SUCCESSION LAW, FROM WHICH INHERITANCE
TAX LAW IS IN LARGE PART DERIVATIVE MEANINGFUL DISTINCTIONS EXIST
QUITE UNIVERSALLY BETWEEN CHIL8

DRl~N AND PERSONS NOT CHILDREN IN
LOCO PARENTIS IN THIS AREA EXCEPT
IN .JURISDICTIONS WHERE SUCH DIS'l'IN('.TIONS ARE SPFJCIFICALLY ABROGA'I'ED BY STATUTE. UTAH IS NOT SUCH
A .JURISDICTION.

Tn the medieval period, the distinctions between an
act na l chilcl and another person in the household not a
cliilrl were extremely significant, particularly in relation
to surh institutions as investiture and primogeniture, as
c•Yerr reader of medieval history and particularly mediernl literature is aware. These distinctions have continued as this law has evolved and are almost universally
present today in the law of inheritance except where
modifie(l hy statute, and these principles have carried
onr into inheritance tax la,Y, which is in large part
derinltiw from the law of inheritance. The general rule
is 11ere stated:
'' ... A stepchild is not ordinarily entitled to inhrrit from its stepfather or stepmother, as the
case may be; but he is so entitled if the case is
·within the terms of the statute conferring the
right of inheritance upon him in a prescribed situation.'' 26A C ..J.C. Descent and Distribution,
sec. 34.
The research in plaintiff's brief supports this proposition, and in doing so negates the argument plaintiff
advances. The appendices show that certain jurisdictions have by statute extended family inheritance tax
exemptions to include stepchildren. In such jurisdictirllls, the stepchild is entitled to the same advantages as
the remainder of the class of which he is made a part by
9

legislative decree. In the states wht>re the legislahu·p
has not seen fit to make such an extension, a stppchild doc,
not receive the same benefits as a natural or (in mri.<;t
cases) an adopted child. It should again be notc'd tlinl
there is no case cited in plaintiff's brief from a jurj 8_
diction without the broader statutory language wher0in a
stepchild has been gra11ted an inheritanc0 tax 0xemptio 11
existing for ''children.''
Plaintiff is, in fact, asking this court to substitute
itself for the legislature of this state ancl to extern1 our
law beyond its obvious intent, on the theory that 1<•gi8liltures in many other states have seen fit to do so and
therefore it must be a good idea.
A number of cases cited in Point I illustrate thr
distinction historically drawn between a child, and one
not a child in loco parentis, in an inheritance or inlwritance tax frame of reference. To the same effect, aml
particularly telling, is In Re Kurtz's Estate, 145 Pa. 631,
23 AtL 322 (1892). Here, the decedent left spe('ific
legacies to natural children, and to stepchildren whom
he designafod in his will as ''children.'' His will also included a residue clause leaving the remainder of his estate after distribution of the specific grants fo his ""'ife
and children." His stepchildren were excluded fro111 this
residual distribution.
Also of interest is Fulton Trust Cornpany Y. Trn1rbridge, 126 Conn. 369, 11 A. 2d 383, 127 A.L.R. /J
(1940). Gardiner Trowbridge brought a child into hi,,
home in 1926, and "became very much attached to him"
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and reforn~cl to him and treated him in every respect
as his sou. In 1929, he made a will, making provision
for this ehild. In 1930, he formally adopted the child.
The court held that this adoption revoked the 1929 will
on assumption of a parental relationship, which under
Com1ecticut law revokes wills previously drawn. To the
same effeet is In Re Guilmartin, 250 App. Div. 762, 293
N.Y. Supp. 665, (1937). Contra, Bowdlear v. Bowdlear,
1J2 ::\lass. 184 (1873).
The court's attention is particularly directed to the
case of Olson v. United States, 175 F. 2d 510 (1949).
H Pre Grace Olson raised a hoy ''as her own child'' until
the child was killed in an airplane crash. The court, interpreting Utah law, denied the mother the right to sue as
tlie heir of such child, because she failed to meet her
"lrnrd011" "affirmatively to prove the fact of adoption."
In Point III of his brief, counsel for plaintiff enumerates a number of cases in various fields of law in
which stepchildren, foster children, etr., have for certain purposes been treated as if they were natural children. In our pluralistic and increasingly complex civilization it is inevitable that a number of such cases should
nrisP, and in their particular factual contexts many of
them undoubtedly do reach desirable results. By no
mPans, however, do they represent a pattern. There are
a comparable number of eases where existing laws, coupled with pragmatic considerations of fact and equity,
ha Ye lecl to contrary holdings. For instance, in Smith v.
,1tla11fic Coast Railroad Company, 212 S. C. 332, 47 S.E.
2d 72:> (1948), Odessa Jackson had treated Nelson But-

11

ler in all r0spects as her actual child si11ce bringing ]1
into her househo1(1 wh0n nine m011ths old, en•11 thou,2;11 f
failed to formrrll>- adopt him. Butler instituted an act
for her wrongful death under a statut0 a11thorizi11~
"child" to bring such a claim. Tho court rull~d that
was not a child of the deceasetl and thNefore with1
standing to hring such an action.

The really si.~nifieant thing about the cnsrs C'itr(l
Point III of plaintiff's brief is that no11e of them rel
even remotely to inheritance taxes; they starnl asi(le t
apart from the e\'Olution which has resnltecl in tl1e e
trolling legal concepts in this area. They deal ,,-ith .
verse possession, liability for medical s0rvie0s, real est
transactions, seduction, interest pa~-ments, gratuit(
servie0s, automobile injuries - just about everything
cept descent and distribution and the tax consequen
of the same. This is the area of law with which we arr h
conc0rned, and in this area a clear distinction lwtw(
children, aml unadopted stepchildren or others in 7,
parentis, exists, and we rospectfnll~, suggest that in t
jurisdiction on]~- natural or adopted children are
titled to the hi~her exemption rate.
POINT III

AN }, DOPTION OF THE POSITION URG:
BY PLA.INTIFF WOULD RESULT IN P:
MINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS AND INVI'
INEQUITIES NOT PRESENT IN CURRE
PRACTICE.

In Point V of his brief plaintiff argues that the Cc
mission could administer the statutory exemption "
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ease if it were extended to include others than natural
or adopted children. While the relevance of this type of
a:-;sertion is not completely apparent, since the Commission has the responsibility to administer laws given it by
the Legislature to the best of its ability, and it is primarily the prerogative of the latter body to worry about
whether or not a particular law might lend itself to ease
of administration, it is clear that an acceptance of plaintitf 's position would in fact bring great administrative
difficulties, the number and variety of which can only he
estimated at this time.
The term" in loco parentis," in spite of its imposing
Lati11 phraseology, is not a precise legal term or in any
sense a term of art, but simply a phrase describing a general supervisory-responsibility relationship existing temporarily or permanently between two people, one of whom
will usually be considerably older than the other. ·when
plaintiff states that the phrase has "a fairly definite
meaning,'' he makes the stongest possible case.
To use this test as determinative as to whether or
not a person should be entitled to the higher exemption
provided for in Section 59-12-2, Utah Code Annotated,
l 053, would bring a number of dimensions and considerations into the administration of this law that have
heretofore been fortunately absent. For example, what
if a boy li\'ed in five foster homes during his childhood?
1f each of the foster parents left property to him, would
earh estate be entitled to the full $40,000 exemption 7 If
uot, would each be entitled to 20% of the exemption;
ancl if the latter, would this be 20% of the full $40,000
or 20% of the $30,000, separating the lower and higher
13

exemptio11; (There are 110 proration proh1ems in the 1n\\
as current I:- atlrninistered.) Awl vvhat if tlw chil<l liwd
(as he urnlonhtedly would have) different p0rio<ls of timr
in the various homes? If he livecl 37.4% of his chil<lhoorl
in one home, would a 37.4% 0xemvtion apply? And wlrni
if the child mmried and left home late, say at ~7 or 28,
would this he the end of the pt•riocl of math<>matir;1I
computations involved, or ·would it he the attainm011t of
majority at 21? Conversely, what if the child married
at 17?
Perhn11s it might be urged that the exemption :-:ho11l1l
only apply if the child were living i11 the home in /ou1
pa.rentis at the time of the death of the dece<lent. In thi,
case, if a child liYed 18 years in one foster home, moHd
into a second home, and had both foster fathers die with
in a few da,\'S after the move, would not a gross im·11uity
be done by a11m'l'ing the second estate the full rxempti011 ~
Incidentall:-, if this type of requirement were adoptr1l,
the instant prolilem would result in a denial of any consideration since thr Bywater children had long sinl'e
moved out of the Sargent home.
Suppose :notlwr possihilit:- - n ehilcl living in one
home, but l;ein~ supported for the most part by another
adult. In thiR case a ·whole new series of possihilitie~
arise to challenge the imagination.
Another hypothetieal presents yet another series of
potential problems. vVhat if a child were temporarily,
say a month every year, in a loco parentis situation with a
relative or other supervising adult. Three months a
yead Eight months~

14

,\ n c~xtension of the law to include stepchildren would
111' a liitl0 easier to handle, since this term is somewhat
kc~:-; \'ague, hut again interpretive and especially equii;il ilC' iirohlems present themselves. Jm;t to cite one example, suppose John Jones married the widow Smith
( 11 lio lias a fiftc>en-year-old daughter) on October 8,
]%().
Suppose further that John Jones died October
D, 1%G. ·would equity and the pnhlie interest be served
hy gi\·ing the daughter a full exemption should Mr. Jones
liHPill'll to lm,·e written a will making her a beneficiary
prior to or on the day of his marriage? Another problem
Hl'l'll would be that of former stepchildren. vVhat if di\'()}"('(' t0rmi11ated a stepfather-stepchild relationship of
1ollg starnling '? \Vonld the exemption he present er
wunlcl it ha\'e been terminated with the divorce?
ff tlw exemption were ext0ndec1 to ineludf' plaintiff's
pn'cise situation, a stepchild in loco porentis, the administratin~ prohlems involved in both of these concepts
wonlcl he <'nmulatively present.

Counsel for plaintiff repeatedly stresses that love,
nffeetion, trust, respect, etc., often exist in these relationships. vVonld it he suggested that the Commission should
;11t<'mpt to measure or e\·aluate these intangible and
snhjcdive emotions in resolving the difficult borderline
('<1Sf'S that \\·onld of necessity arise under any regulatory
1-;elwrne?
'\Ve would suggest that an adoption of petitioner's
position, or any part thereof, would not result in a conti11uation of the administrative ease with which the stat-
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ute is no-w ha11clled, but rather in administrative clHlON.
We would respectfully petition the court to keep the lid
firmly closed on this Pandora's box.

POINT IV
AFFIR~IANCE OF THE TAX COMMISSION
DECISION WOULD INSURE IN MOST CAs1~;s
THAT THE WISH OF THE TESTATOH IS
HONORED, AND WOULD ENCOURAGE
ADOPTION.

Plaintiff argues in Point IV of his brief that a11 ai'firmance of the Tax Commission's decision would frustrate the statutory policy of encouraging testators to
leave estates to members of their immediate family. It
is submitted that the Tax Commission's decision "·ould
have exactly the opposite effect.
Great emphasis is placed in plaintiff's brief on the
love, affection and sentiment, and mutual need that can
exist between stepchildren and step-parents and hctween adults and other minors in their home who arc
not children of such parents. It is further suggested
that the step-parent, foster parent, etc., would in such a
situation of ne'.'essity have the same motives and desires
in relation to dic;position of their property to the stepchildren or other minor as would a natural parent to hi~
child. vVhile this may or may not be true in any giw11
situation, and while it is obviously impossible in this
situation, in spite of all the affidavits and arguments
offered by com1Sel for plaintiff, to determine ·whether or
not Mr. Sargent had that type of affection and sentiments
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toward the Bywater children, since Mr. Sargent, the only
l!l'rson who would really be competent to testify to the
pn~sc•uce or absence of such subjective emotions and motin•R, is deceased, ·we point out to the court that the law
bas established a prucedure by which a step-parent or
other adult in this type of situation can make certain that
the stepchild or other minor receive exactly the same
lJl•nefits and consideration at the time his estate is distributPd as a natural child. This procedure is adoption.
Examination of the record can leave little doubt that
:i1 r. Sargent had ample opportunity over a large number
of yearR to adopt these children and assure that they
would be treated in all respects as his natural children,
including in respeet to inheritanee and inheritance taxes.
SincE' it is presumed that every man knows the law,
it may be argued that Mr. Sargent knew of the inheritance and inheritance tax consequences of both adoption
and non-adoption and chose the latter. Certainly it is ineonsistent with the record for plaintiff to suggest that
~Ir. Sargent, because of his purported love and affection
for the Bywater boys, would have been very anxious for
them to have the same tax benefits as natural children,
when it was solely within his power for many years to
make certain that such benefits would be attained by
them, and he failed to take the necessary steps to insure
that sueh would be the case. If any legal inference can
be dra,vn from his failure to adopt, it is certainly not an
infernnce that he wished these stepchildren to be treated
in all respeets as if they had been adopted.
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Undc>r Utah law as 1ww admiuisten~d, it is thus oftp 11
the testator who determines in this type of ea1w wlwiltf·r
or not tlw In rp;cr exemption ma~- he allowed.
Title 78, Chapter 30, Utah C'o<l<' Am10tated, rn:!:l,
contains the adoption lmvs in this j urisdietion. Seei ion
10 proYicl<'S :
A ehilcl when adopted may take the' family name
of the person adopti11g. After adovtio11 the tnn
shall s11stain the legal rrlation of parent and rhild,
and hare all the rights and be s11bjPtt to a/1 t71r:
duties of that relationship. (Emphasis snpplir1l)

It seems axiomatic that if thruugh adopti011 hn1
people atbin the relationship of pare11t and cl1ihl, \ritlt
all attendant rig·hts and obligations, that before ado)ltion such relationship did not exist. As has preyionslY
been pointed out, an abundance of case authorit~- supports this proposition.
Some states make certain (1isti11ctiorn; l!ctwee11 adopt
ed and natural children; for instance, in this jurisdiction
an adopted child i.s not '' issne. '' L1 my Y. A my, 12 LT tali
278, 42 Pac. 1121 (1895), aff'd, 171 U. S. 179, 43 L. Ed.
127, 18 Sup. Ct. 802, In Re Harrington's Estate, 96 TTtnh
252, 85 P. 2d 6:10, 128 A.L.R. 130 ( 19:18). In most juris<lirtions, howe-«cr, adopted children are accorded the same
rights in the prws of inheritance and inheritmwe tnx
benefits as natural children, and the clear trend seems to
be toward broader implementation of this laudatory 110!icy. See cases summarized in 105 A.L.R. 1176, 127 A.LR
750 and, most recently, in 43 A.L.R. 2d 118.
18

rtaJi is d(~ar!y ('0Inlllitt0d to the proposition that,
for irnrposes of inheritance taxation, adopted children
a re to be treated exactly as natural children. See Sectio11s 74-1-31, 74-1-32, 74-4-5 as amended, and 74-4-12,
Ftnh (~ode Annotated, 1953. This makes it possible for
ally testator who wishes to carry out his desire to have
strpehihhen, foster children, etc., treated in all respects
as his own chil<lren to do so. The Tax Commission has
]ollg re<'ognized the identity of interests and rights of
natural ancl adopted children as being in the best interests
of t-<Ociety. An adherence to the policy urged by plaintiff
would discourage adoption proceedings, and thereby disennrage family unity and solidarity, which are desirable
public policy goals.

The Commission has through the years consistently
interpreted the relevant statutory provisions to not allo-w
the higher exemption to apply to stepchildren, foster chilclrl'n, or others not natural or adopted children who are
in loco parentis to decedents. It is submitted that this
long-standing interpretation and practice is correct and
should be considered in the court's deliberations, for
"where contemporaneous and practical interpretation
has stood unchallenged for a considerable length of time,
it will be regarded as of great importance in arriving at
tl10 proper construction of a statute.'' Sutherland, Sta tutor>· Construction, 3cl ed., sec. 5107.
The citizens and the Legislature of this State, and its
Bar and Bench have for decades acquiesced without challenge in the Commission's interpretations and administration of this law. This acquiescence is persuasive evi19

dence of the correctness of the Commission's interpretation. Couch v. Independent Brotherhood of Teamsters
308 P. 2d 117 (Okla. 1956); State v. Yelle, 52 Wash. 2d'
158, 324 P. 2d 247 (1951); Shockley v. Abbott Supply Co.,
50 Del. 510, 135 A. 2d 607 (1957); Dixie Coaches v. Ramsden, 238 Ala. 285, 190 So. 92 (1939); Murray Hospital Y.
Angrove, 92 Mont. 101, 10 P. 2d 577 (1932).

CONCLUSION
Section 59-12-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, rstal1lishes a special exemption from inheritance tax imposition when properties are devised or hequeathed to the
husband, wife, or children of the decedent. The tr rm
"children" by its plain meaning is limited to natural or
adopted children in this jurisdiction and this limiting interpretation evolved from and is totally consistent with
the body of Anglo-American law, particularly that part
dealing with descent and succession.
Some states have chosen to modify this common law
approach by extending special inheritance tax exemption
provisions to a larger class, sometimes including stepchildren or others not natural or adopted children in locu
parentis. In such jurisdictions a more liberal exemption
is appropriate according to the statutory directive. In
jurisdictions such as Utah, however, which have not hy
statute extended the common law concept to permit step-
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children or others uot in loco parentis to the decedent to
be tr<:> a ted as children for inheritance purposes, relief
such as the executor is here seeking is not available.
Our statute is clear but even if it were ambiguous,
any doubt as to its meaning would have to be resolved
against the taxpayer asserting exemption and in favor of
the taxing authority.
No inequity would be done by affirming the Commission's decision, since the Legislature has provided a
means - adoption - whereby persons can secure to a
stepchild or another in loco parentis the same benefits
that accrue to a natural child. Had the decedent, Herbert
E. Sargent, adopted the Bywaters as he could have done,
he could have provided for them the exemption they are
now seeking. Since he had this power and he failed to
exercise it, it is not consistent for the estate to argue for whatever such argument is worth - that he wanted
these boys to be treated in all particulars as his natural
children.
A reversal of the Commission's decision in this matter would bring into what is at this time a very clean and
equitable administration of a law uncertainty and sometimes even chaos. As compared to ''children,'' which is
a clear and precise legal concept in this frame of ref erence, requiring no strained interpretation, the phrase ''in
loco parentis'' is vague indeed, since a child may be ''in
loco parentis" to any number of adults during his lifetime.
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In view of the above, and in reliance 011 existillg C«t~t·
law, particularly the Walton case, it is respectfully s111imitted that the decision of the Tax Commission was correct and equitable, and it is urged that this decisio11 br
affirmed by this honorable court in its review at this time.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. IIANSFJN
Attorney General
1\1. REED HUNTJjjR
Assistant A ttorncy General
State Capitol Building

Attorneys for Defendant
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